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Dolinko: Alschuler's "Path"

ALSCHULER'S "PATH"
David Dolinko*
I am honored to have been invited to comment on the work of so
distinguished and thoughtful a scholar as Professor Albert Alschuler. He
was himself commenting on the work of an even more illustrious
predecessor, and has done so in his usual insightful, trenchant manner.
The result is an article that comes down firmly on one side of the longrunning debate that swirls around the thought, the character, and the
influence of Oliver Wendell Holmes.
Assessments of Holmes have been extraordinarily diverse.' Two
drastically different portraits emerge from the opinions at either extreme.
The first depicts "one of the finest minds and greatest spirits that
American civilization has produced,"2 a man who "like the Winged
Victory of Samothrace... is the summit of hundreds of years of
civilization, the inspiration of ages yet to come."3 This Holmes, hailed
as "the greatest of our age in the domain of jurisprudence, and one of
the greatest of the ages," 4 exhibited not merely a "deeply democratic
faith in man's power of reason"' but "strong moral and ethical views
concerning decency and justice among mankind."'6 "His massive
distinction has not been dented by his many detractors,"7 for his "true
greatness" rests on his "infusion of literary skill and philosophical
insight into his legal work."' Finally, although "[h]is detachment has
often been confused with coldness," this is wrong: "in his judicial
as in his letters, warmth, charm, even sweetness are conspicuopinions
9
ous."

Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. B.A., Columbia University,
1969; J.D., UCLA, 1980; Ph.D., UCLA, 1982.
1. See generally G. Edward White, The Rise and Fall of Justice Holmes, 39 U. CHI. L.
*

REV. 51 (1971).
2. Fred Rodell, Justice Holmes and His Hecklers, 60 YALE L.J. 620, 620 (1951).
3. Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., The Democracy of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 7 VAND.
L. REV. 311, 323 (1954).
4. Benjamin N. Cardozo, Mr Justice Holmes, 44 HARV. L. REV. 682, 684 (1931).
5. Rodell, supra note 2, at 622.
6. Id. at 623.
7. Richard A. Posner, Introduction to THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE
LETrERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
JR. at xxx (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992) [hereinafter THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES].
8. Id. at xvi.
9. Id. at xxii.
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The second portrait is shockingly different. This Holmes is a believer
that "might makes right" who "recognized no moral limitations on
sovereign power."' Indeed, his "basic principles lead straight to the
abasement of man before the absolutist state.". "Fatalistic, mistrustful
of reason, obsessed with the ubiquity of force," this Holmes was
"[g]enerally indifferent to civil liberties interests.' "[S]avage, harsh,
and cruel," he "saw in the course of human life nothing but a continuing
struggle in which the rich and powerful impose their will on the poor
and weak."' 3 Not that this upset him: "To a remarkable degree, Holmes
simply did not care."' 4 He was "indifferent, at times savagely so, to the
lives of his fellow mortals."' 5 And "his relentless insistence on understanding the world through military metaphors"' 6 generated a flawed
"vision of the law" positing "a martial condition of stark alternatives
and not the gradings and shadows that normally surround us on the
human journey' 7 -indeed, blinding Holmes to even so crucial a truth
as "the fact that law can provide a peaceable alternative to violence."' 8
Recognizing the impact Holmes had on American legal thinking, those
who see him in these somber hues can only "ask: At what cost to the
law has his influence been felt these hundred years?"' 9 It is that very
question that Professor Alschuler means to pursue.
Opening with a sample of the accolades so frequently lavished on
The Path of the Law, Professor Alschuler locates the distinctive vision
that the article presents--"Holmesian positivism"-in the conjunction
of four ideas.20 These are the "prediction theory of law," the " 'badman' perspective on law," the attack on using moral terminology in law,
and the "alternative theory of contract."'" What follows is a sustained
effort to demonstrate that every one of these ideas is not only false but
pernicious. The prediction theory is hopelessly confused and inadequate,
and does justice neither to the ordinary usage of "law" nor to the law's
10. Ben W. Palmer, Hobbes, Holmes and Hitler, 31 A.B.A. J. 569, 571 (1945).
11. Id. at 573.
12. Yosal Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 213, 256 (1964).
13. GRANT GILMORE, 'ME AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 48-49 (1977).
14. Rogat, supra note 12, at 255.
15. White, supra note 1,at 77.
16. David Luban, Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of JudicialRestraint,44 DuKE L.J.
449, 513 (1994).
17. Saul Touster, Holmes a HundredYears Ago: The Common Law and Legal Theory, 10
HOFSTRA L. REV. 673, 707-08 (1982).
18. Luban, supra note 16, at 514.
19. Touster, supra note 17, at 708.
20. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Descending Trail: Holmes' Path of the Law One
Hundred Years Later, 49 FLA. L. REV. 353, 354-56 (1997).
21. Id. at 355-56.
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role in the lives of legal practitioners and of ordinary citizens. The
closely related "bad-man" perspective is not merely bungled by Holmes,
who misdescribes what a "bad man" would actually care about, but
imposes a grossly distorted view of how law functions and the reasons
why most people obey it. As for Holmes' opposition to the legal use of
a moral vocabulary-which Professor Alschuler regards as a paradigm
of positivists' insistence on the "separation of law and morals"-Professor Alschuler argues that simply identifying what "the law"
is will often require the application of moral norms. Finally, the
alternative theory of contract is derided as resting on a wholesale
falsification of the concept of "duty." Ultimately, it seems, Professor
Alschuler regards The Path of the Law as a destructive and corrupting
force in American legal thinking.
The most curious feature of what Professor Alschuler has written is
not that he regards Holmes as wrong on all important points. Neither is
it his harsh assessment of Holmes' influence. Rather, it is the extraordinarily obvious nature of so many of the mistakes Holmes is said to have
made. Professor Alschuler ascribes to Holmes a general theory of the
nature of lawn that, as even a moment's reflection reveals, makes
nonsense of what Holmes himself had been doing for fifteen years as a
judge when he wrote The Path of the Law. He tells us that Holmes
unaccountably failed to notice that sheriffs can be bribed to disobey
court orders23 and that courts themselves can act unlawfully.' And he
suggests that Holmes, quite astonishingly, "maintained that good people
do not need law." Such glaring errors are hardly what one would
expect from the man frequently singled out as America's greatest legal
thinker.26 Professor Alschuler himself observes that "Holmesian
stupidity" is a most "unlikely" hypothesis.27
Surely a more plausible hypothesis is that Holmes did not really hold
the most egregious of the views attributed to him-not, at least, as
components of a general, systematic," 'conceptual truth about the nature

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See id.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 373.
Id. at 376.
Morton Horwitz describes Holmes as "the most important and influential legal thinker
America has had." MORTON HoRwrTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960,
at 109 (1992). Sanford Levinson echoes that judgment: "Holmes is, I believe, the single most
important thinker about law that America has produced." Sanford Levinson, Fan Letters, 75
TEX. L. REV. 1471, 1471 (1997). Richard Posner says that "he remains the leading figure in
American jurisprudence." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 19 (1990).
27. Alschuler, supranote 20, at 413.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1997

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[V/ol. 49

of law.' "28 H.L.A. Hart, commenting years ago about Holmes'
"prediction theory" and other perplexing positivistic utterances,
suggested viewing such claims as "paradoxical or exaggerated ways of
emphasizing some aspect of law which, in the author's view, is either
obscured by ordinary legal terminology, or has been unduly neglected
by previous theorists."2 9 And he immediately added a wise caution
which Professor Alschuler seems to have disregarded:
In the case of any important jurist, it is frequently profitable
to defer consideration of the question whether his statements about law are literally true or false, and to examine
first, the detailed reasons given by him in support of his
statements and secondly, the conception or theory of law
which his statement is designed to displace.3"
With Holmes, "detailed reasons" in support of his views are often
lacking; the cryptic, elliptic nature of his aphoristic style has often been
noted.3 But he does describe the conception of law he wants to displace.
It is "the notion that a given [legal] system, ours, for instance, can be
worked out like mathematics from some general axioms of conduct."32
That this conception is fallacious-that legal principles ultimately rest
on contestable policy judgments, and that judges and lawyers ought "to
consider more definitely and explicitly the social advantage on which
the rule they lay down must be justified" 33 -is as prominent and
influential a thesis of The Path of the Law as the four that Professor
Alschuler singles out for attack.
' in action just
Holmes had challenged "the fallacy of logical form" 34
ten weeks before delivering The Path of the Law when he dissented in
Vegelahn v. Guntner from an opinion upholding an injunction against

28. Id. at 371 (quoting Thomas C. Grey, Holmes andLegalPragmatism,41 STAN. L. REV.

787, 828 (1989)).
29. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 232 (1st ed. 1961).
30. Id.
31. "Cryptic" seems to be a ubiquitous characterization of Holmes' judicial work product.
See, e.g., Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 523 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); Adam J. Hirsch, Searching Inside Justice Holmes, 82 VA. L. REV. 385, 409 (1996);
Yosal Rogat, Mr Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN. L. REV. 3, 9 (1963); G.
Edward White, The Integrity of Holmes' Jurisprudence, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 633, 649, 671
(1982). And one might say of Holmes' essays, as Posner does of his judicial opinions, that they
"owe their distinction to their rhetorical skill rather than to the qualities of their reasoning; often
they are not well reasoned at all." THE ESSENTIAL HoLMES, supra note 7, at xvii.
32. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465 (1897).
33. Id. at 468.
34. Id.
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labor picketing." The majority viewed the picketing as a violation of the
contractual freedom both of the employer and of actual or prospective
employees.36 That the picketing was a weapon in the defendants'
struggle to wrest higher wages from the plaintiff could not justify it in
the face of the legal principle that "a combination to do injurious acts
expressly directed to another, by way of intimidation or constraint, either
of himself or of persons employed or seeking to be employed by him,
is outside of allowable competition, and is unlawful."37 Holmes,
dissenting, faulted his colleagues for relying on general principles such
as this without considering the underlying policies that both justified and
limited them: "[t]he true grounds of decision are considerations of
policy and of social advantage, and it is vain to suppose that solutions
can be attained merely by logic and general propositions of law which
' The employer's supposed
nobody disputes."38
"right" against injury to
his business is overridden "in numberless instances"39 where the
conduct inflicting such injury is justified by such "considerations of
policy"-including, Holmes argued, the policy of promoting free
competition between economic rivals.'
An even clearer example of the conception of law that Holmes was
rebelling against appears in the writing of C.C. Langdell, Dean of the
Harvard Law School from 1870 to 1895 and the pioneer of the case
method of legal education. Thomas Grey describes how Langdell dealt
with a problem of contract law in his Summary of the Law of Contracts
(1880):
When someone accepts a contractual offer by mail, does the
contract become binding when the acceptance is mailed or
when it is received?... [Miost modem writers have agreed
that the balance of convenience favors making the acceptance binding when mailed-the so-called "mailbox
rule." ...
When Langdell confronted it, the question had not yet
been settled.... According to Langdell, the issue between
the alternatives was not merely a practical one. In his view,
fundamental principles dictated that the acceptance must be
received before the contract could be formed. This followed
from the doctrine that a promise could not be binding
unless it was supported by consideration. The consideration
35. 44 N.E. 1077, 1078 (Mass. 1896).

36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 1077.
Id. at 1078.
Id. at 1080.
Id.

40. See id.
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for the offer was the offeree's return promise. But a
promise by its nature is not complete until communicated;
a "promise" into the air is no promise at all. Since there
was no promise, there was no consideration and could be
and
no contract, until the letter of acceptance was received
41
read. The mailbox rule could not be good law.
Langdell thus purports to resolve a real-world legal issue by tracing the
logical implications of the relevant legal concepts, without any attention
to the practical effects on the interests of the parties concerned.
Reviewing Langdell's book, Holmes reacted to this procedure-and to
Langdell's dismissing those effects as "irrelevant"--by labelling
Langdell a "legal theologian."'42 In The Path of the Law, Holmes sought
to reverse Langdell's estimation of the relative significance of the
practical and the logical implications of legal concepts. 43 And Langdell's
willingness to brand as "not good law" even rules accepted by the
courts, if those rules flouted his logical deductions, was the clearest
target of the prediction theory and the bad man perspective:
Take the fundamental question, What constitutes the law?
You will find some text writers telling you that it is
something different from what is decided by the courts of
Massachusetts or England, that it is a system of reason, that
it is a deduction from principles of ethics or admitted
axioms or what not, which may or may not coincide with
the decisions. But if we take the view of our friend the bad
man we shall find that he does not care two straws for the
axioms or deductions, but that he does want to know what
the Massachusetts or English courts are likely to do in fact.
I am much of his mind. The prophecies of what the courts
will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I
mean by the law."
What Langdell and the Vegelahn majority shared, in Holmes' eyes,
was a profoundly misleading view of law. It depicts "the law" as a
collection of general propositions from which judges could deduce
41. Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1983).
42. Touster, supra note 17, at 709-10 app. 1 (reprinting Holmes' review of C.C.
LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1879)). This review originally
appeared unsigned at 14 AM. L. REv. 233 (1880).
43. "The doctrine of consideration is merely historical.... Consideration is a mere form.
Is it a useful form? If so, why should it not be required in all contracts?... Why should any
merely historical distinction be allowed to affect the rights and obligations of business men?"
Holmes, supra note 32, at 472.
44. Id. at 460-61.
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correct answers to concrete cases through value-neutral logical techniques, without taking sides in contentious political debates. Dissatisfaction with such a picture of law was a recurring theme in Holmes'
writings by the time the Path lecture was delivered.45 Defining law as
'
merely "[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact,"46
and
insisting that its distinctive features are best observed from the "bad
man" perspective, can be viewed as strategies for undermining the
misleading picture of the law as "a box that [lawyers] pull off the shelf
when a legal question appears, in the hope of finding the answer in it,"
and substituting a picture of law as an activity or a practice-as
"something that licensed persons, mainly judges, lawyers, and legislators, do."47 Of course these strategies themselves make use of onesided, exaggerated claims about law that are easy to ridicule. But
philosophical reflection on a great many topics has historically
proceeded by way of successive reactions against successive orthodoxies, with each corrective in its turn going too far in a different direction.
One need only think, for example, of Holmes' contemporaries, the
pragmatists, and the curious utterances with which they challenged
overly rationalistic or idealistic theories of truth.4"
This way of viewing what Holmes was up to suggests, on the one
hand, that he did-as Professor Alschuler believes-view his "positivist,

45. The most well-known example is of course the famous opening paragraph of The
Common Law (1881), with its celebrated declaration that "the life of the law has not been logic:
it has been experience," and its insistence that law has been shaped by "[t]he felt necessities of
the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, [and] intuitions of public policy." OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark D. Howe ed., Harv. Univ. Press 1963) (1881).
The theme is adumbrated as early as an essay on The Gas-Stokers' Strike, published when
Holmes was 32, in which he called it "a singular anomaly that believers in the theory of
evolution.., should be found laying down a theory of government intended to establish its
limits once for all by a logical deduction from axioms." TIE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note
7, at 121. And Holmes had explicitly stressed the policy-based nature of legal reasoning a few
years prior to The Pathof the Law in a discussion of privilege to inflict harm on others. Whether
such a privilege should be recognized in given circumstances was "a question of policy"-but
because judges "are shy of reasoning from such grounds," their decisions "often are presented
as hollow deductions from empty general propositions ...or else are put as if they themselves
embodied a postulate of the law and admitted of no further deductions." Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1894).
46. Holmes, supra note 32, at 461.
47. POSNER, supra note 26, at 225.
48. William James, for example, wrote: " 'The true,' to put it very briefly, is only the
expedient in the way of our thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in the way of our
behaving." William James, Pragmatism, in WRmNGS 1902-1910, at 583 (Library of America,
1987). No wonder he later lamented that he and fellow pragmatists "in many places used a
language too slipshod. We never should have spoken elliptically." Id. at 918, in The Pragmatist
Account of Truth and Its Misunderstanders.
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predictive language" as "expressing 'a conceptual truth about the nature
of law.' 9 Yet it also suggests that Alschuler errs in taking Holmes'
talk of law as prediction, and the accompanying "bad man" perspective,
in so deadly literal a fashion. For example, Professor Alschuler thinks
Holmes must view the "law in the books" as a nullity-as not law at
all-if it is unenforced, even if "nonenforcement is ad hoc and the
product of ignorance, limited economic resources, whim, mercy,
kindness, or corruption."5 Yet Holmes would almost certainly balk at
this conclusion, as suggested by his remark that he meant by law "that
which is or should be enforced by the Courts."'" If Holmes' talk of
"predictions" and "bad men" is primarily a device-a sort of conceptual
exercise-for dispelling an erroneous picture of law, rather than a
genuine definition of law at all, there is no reason to suppose Holmes
would insist on applying that talk as rigidly as Alschuler suggests, and
drawing such implausible conclusions. And if the picture Holmes is
challenging is one of law as a set of propositions, it would be wrong to
treat Holmes as simply defining law as a different set of propositions.
I have suggested that the prediction/bad-man theory can be seen as
a heuristic device to get Holmes' audience to think of law as an activity
rather than as a set of rules. 2 Whether Holmes himself thought of it in
just this manner I do not claim to know. He may well have conceived
3
of it differently at different times or in different contexts. My point is
only that the heuristic-device conception makes sense in terms of what
Holmes was reacting against, and allows us to grasp how people could
find illuminating and helpful a view that, as Professor Alschuler
demonstrates, quickly falls to pieces if taken literally as a self-sufficient
general account of the nature of law.

49. Alschuler, supra note 20, at 371 (quoting Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal
Pragmatism,41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 828 (1989)).
50. Id. at 368.
51. Letter to Harold Laski (Jan. 29, 1926), in I HoLMEs-LASKI LETrERS 822 (Mark D.
Howe ed., 1953) (emphasis added). The context was a discussion of whether a sovereign could
be bound by law without its consent.
52. The suggestion is drawn from Posner's account of how the prediction theory could be
defended against the objection that it is inapplicable to the work of judges. POSNER, supra note
26, at 224-26.
53. Holmes was not a consistent thinker, and could on occasion flout even precepts he
most ardently championed. The need to keep legal and moral concepts separate was just such
a precept, reiterated in The Pathof the Law and in many other places. Yet in an essay published
two years after Path, Holmes defended his theory of contract interpretation by arguing that the
alternative "would run against a plain principle of justice"--using "justice" as a moral concept
that can be appealed to in determining what legal rule to adopt. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The
Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899).
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In any event, Professor Alschuler is surely uncharitable in his reading
of the "bad man" talk. I see nothing in The Path of the Law that
suggests "that good people do not need law."' Professor Alschuler
does, pointing to Holmes' assertion that,
[i]f you want to know the law and nothing else, you must
look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material
consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict,
not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct,
whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer
sanctions of conscience.'
But all Holmes is saying here about "good people" is that their motive
for doing the right thing (including acting in conformity to law) is not
fear of legal punishment. This is wholly consistent with believing that
good people pay plenty of attention to law in deciding what is the right
thing to do.
Nor is it fair for Professor Alschuler to insinuate that Holmes
actually wanted people in general to view law as a "bad man" would.
This is not an opinion Professor Alschuler explicitly ascribes to Holmes,
but is suggested when he sneers at Holmes as author of The Spirit of the
Loophole56 and speaks of "bad men" as "the Holmesians." s In The
Path of the Law itself, Holmes (over-optimistically) remarked, "I take
it for granted that no hearer of mine will misinterpret what I have to say
as the language of cynicism," explaining:
The law is the witness and external deposit of our moral
life. Its history is the history of the moral development of
the race. The practice of it, in spite of popular jests, tends
to make good citizens and good men. When I emphasize
the difference between law and morals I do so with reference58to a single end, that of learning and understanding the
law.
And Holmes' conduct on the bench betrayed no attachment to "The
Spirit of the Loophole." Had he regarded the key question as "how
much can I get away with?," he would scarcely have been found so

54. Alschuler, supra note 20, at 376.
55. Holmes, supra note 32, at 459.
56. Alschuler, supra note 20, at 374.

57. Id. at 379.
58. Holmes, supra note 32, at 459.
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frequently defending the right of people to advocate or to act on
principles that he himself believed foolish, and even pernicious. 9
Whether or not Holmes meant his "prediction theory" as an
appropriate definition of law for all or most purposes, Professor
Alschuler does propose such a generally applicable definition: "Law
consists of those societal settlements that a good person should regard
as authoritative."' Clearly, this definition is intended to help bring out
the inadequacy of Holmes' de-moralized, "bad man" approach-and, by
extension, the inadequacy of such purely positivist accounts of law as
those offered by H.L.A. Hart 6 and Richard Posner.62 I fear, however,
that Professor Alschuler's corrective to the one-sidedness and the
distortions of positivism raises its own serious problems if put forward
as "[a]n appropriate definition of law for most purposes."63 Consider
the following:
(1) For starters, Professor Alschuler's definition begs the very
question that Professor Alschuler himself believes is "the primary reason
for seeking a definition of law"--namely, why is there an obligation
(at least presumptively) to obey the law? Professor Alschuler acknowledges the question-begging, but says that "the question it begs may be
the right one-one that lies at the root of most theoretical efforts to

59. Thus, Holmes famously dissented in the Vegelahn case from an opinion upholding an
injunction against peaceful labor picketing. See supratext accompanying notes 34-40. He argued
that workers had "the same liberty that combined capital has to support their interests by
argument, persuasion, and the bestowal or refusal of those advantages which they otherwise
lawfully control." Vegelahn, 44 N.E. at 1081. Even more famous are the dissents defending the
free speech rights of radicals and Communists in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31
(1919) and Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925), and protesting the denial of
naturalization to a pacifist in United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 653-55 (1929). Yet
Holmes himself commented that the labor movement was basically misguided, see, e.g., Plant
v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011, 1015-16 (Mass. 1900) (Holmes, C.J., dissenting), that extending free
speech to radicals and Communists was "simply upholding the right of a donkey to drool,"
Letter to Lewis Einstein (July 11, 1925), reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 7,
at 322, and that pacifism was "perhaps the silliest of all ['isms]," Letter to Harold Laski (Apr.
13, 1929), 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 1146 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1953)-indeed, that "war not
only is not absurd but is inevitable and rational," Letter to Sir Frederick and Lady Pollock (Sept.
20, 1928), 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETrERS 230 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1944).
60. Alschuler, supra note 20, at 393 (citing PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, REASON IN THE
BALANCE: CASE AGAINST NATURALISM IN SCIENCE, LAW AND EDUCATION 140 (1995)).

61. Hart and kindred positivists are most explicitly taken to task in Part IV of Alschuler's
paper. See id. at 380-86.
62. Alschuler subjects the law-and-economics school of which Posner is the most
prominent representative to sustained (and, I believe, convincing) criticism when he examines
the "alternative theory of contracf' and its extension to criminal law. See id. at 410-19.
63. Id. at 393.
64. Id. at 390.
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define law."65 Precisely why it should be less objectionable to beg a
really important question is, I'm afraid, a mystery.
(2) We might ask, next, why Professor Alschuler defines law in
terms of what only good people should regard as authoritative.
Shouldn't bad people regard the very same "societal settlements" as
authoritative? Presumably they won't: part (at least) of what makes the
"bad man" bad is that he feels no obligation to conform to the law, and
instead "cares only for the material consequences" he will suffer if
caught disobeying.' Yet surely we believe that bad people should regard
the law as binding, even though we realize that they (often) will not.
Perhaps, then, we should amend Professor Alschuler's definition by
deleting "good": Law consists of those societal settlements that a person
should regard as authoritative.
Alternatively, it may be that Professor Alschuler's point is that the
good person (but not the bad) actually would regard as authoritative
those "settlements" that should be so regarded. Accordingly, we could
alter Professor Alschuler's definition to read: Law consists of those
societal settlements that a good person would regard as authoritative.
(3) Amended or not, however, the definition will include far too
much. Professor Alschuler notes that by using the phrase "societal
settlements" he "leaves open the possibility that custom may qualify as
law in some societies,"'67 but in fact many prevailing customs and
social practices in our own society will count-wrongly-as law under
his definition. It is customary in America to excuse oneself if one
bumps into another pedestrian, and this custom is "authoritative"-one
that "a good person should respect"-as shown by the censure with
which its breach is regarded. The same is true, much more strongly, of
the practice of keeping one's promises, including those not made as part
of contracts-like Professor Alschuler's example of "showing up for a
date."6 Yet no one would say that the law requires us to keep our noncontractual promises, nor to apologize to strangers whom we jostle.
How could this last objection be countered? Not by denying that
keeping promises and apologizing for bumps are "societal settlements,"
given the breadth with which Professor Alschuler wants to employ that
term.69 Could we deny that these practices are "authoritative"? Well,
65. Id. at 394-95.
66. Holmes, supra note 32, at 459.
67. Alschuler, supra note 20, at 394 n.133.
68. Id. at 381.
69. See id. at 394 n.133. Confusingly, however, Alschuler occasionally speaks of
"purported social settlements," id. at 395, 399, "purported societal settlements," id. at 399, or
"purported settlements," id. at 398. Yet in all of these places, what is only "purported" is not
that the item under discussion (e.g., the fugitive slave clause of the Constitution) is truly a
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most people subjectively feel that they themselves ought to behave in
these ways and moreover will treat these norms of behavior as the basis
for evaluating other people's conduct. And failure to comply is
commonly met with sanctions, in the form of other people's disapproval
and condemnation. (A person who breaks promises at will is likely to
be regarded as an outright liar, and shunned accordingly.) Could we
stipulate that no "settlement" is "authoritative" unless its breach makes
one liable to the imposition of legal sanctions? But to make that part of
a definition of law appears viciously circular. Moreover, it appears to
bring us back to Holmes' "bad man" view!
This difficulty about the over-inclusiveness of Professor Alschuler's
definition suggests that Alschuler may have fallen into the opposite error
from the one that he ascribes to Holmes. Holmes may well have gone
too far in one direction by insisting that only what courts do is "law."7
However, Professor Alschuler may go too far in the opposite direction
by cutting his account of law free from any connection with the idea
that disobedience will bring penalty or punishment at the hands of those
with a monopoly of the legitimate use of force.
(4) In addition to improperly conferring the title of "law" on some
"societal settlements" that should not receive it, Professor Alschuler's
definition may also inappropriately withhold the status of law from other
items. Recall that for Professor Alschuler, only those "societal settlements" that a (good) person should respect 7 or regard as authoritative72 count as law. "The suggestion.., is that often in everyday
discourse and even more often in the discourse of legal theorists law
means 'settlements entitled to respect.' "" It follows that those social
settlements which are not entitled to respect, and which a (good) person
ought not to regard as authoritative, are simply not law---even if
embodied in a duly enacted statute, a Supreme Court decision, or a
provision of the Constitution itself.
But is this really either a natural or a desirable way of speaking?
Like Professor Alschuler, I regard Harriet Tubman as heroic, and her
defiance of pro-slavery laws as justified and commendable.74 The
Fugitive Slave Act was not entitled to her respect. Perhaps, as Professor

societal settlement, but rather that that settlement is truly binding, authoritative, or deserving of
respect. Alschuler should therefore speak, as in one place he does, of "settlements that purport
to be binding," id. at 396, rather than of "purported settlements."

70. See id. at 369-73.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See id. at 399.
See id. at 393.
Id. at 396 n.137.
See id. at 404.
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Alschuler suggests, it was not entitled to any American's respect." I do
not understand, however, why these opinions should lead me to deny
that the Fugitive Slave Act was really "law." Can we endorse Tubman's
actions only by thus insisting that she actually violated no valid "law"
at all? Adopting that position seems to yield a false description of what
Tubman was in fact doing. Moreover, it would appear to commit us to
the belief that, for example, every antebellum judge who obeyed the Act
and ordered the return of runaway slaves was acting unlawfully, and
hence engaging in flagrantly criminal conduct. 6 Likewise, it would be
hard to condone Abraham Lincoln's pledge to honor the Constitution's
fugitive slave clause' if that clause is correctly viewed as too iniquitous
to be valid law at all.
(5) How Professor Alschuler could escape the difficulties brought out
in the previous paragraph is apparent from his sensitive and thoughtful
examination of the wide variety of circumstances that affect the "respect
' For the very first of
owed settlements that purport to be binding."78
these "circumstances" that he discusses is the influence of the social
role of the individual who must decide whether to comply with a
"societal settlement." "[T]he respect owed a directive that on its face
governs all members of a society may depend upon one's social
role."7 9 Lincoln, had he been elected Senator, would have sworn to
respect the settlement embodied in the fugitive slave clause of the
Constitution and would thus (apparently) have had an obligation to obey
that clause," just as the judges' social roles imposed a similar obligation
on them. A private citizen, however-and especially a former slave like
Harriet Tubman-took no such oath and bore no such obligation.
But this escape from objection (4) above is purchased at very high
cost: it commits Professor Alschuler to a bizarre relativization of the
very notion of "the law." If "law means 'settlements entitled to
respect' "' and "different roles in society ... give rise to different
obligations to treat purported settlements as binding," 2 then what is
law for a person occupying one role may well not be law for a
person-even though a member of the same society-who occupies a
different role. It is wrong to ask whether, for example, the holding of

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See id. at 397.
See HART, supra note 29, at 203-07 (discussing "legal validity and resistance to law").
Alschuler, supra note 20, at 396-98.
See id. at 396.
Id.

80. See id. at 396-97.
81. See id. at 396 n.137.
82. See id. at 398.
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Roe v. Wade83 is law simpliciter. We must ask whether it is law for a
federal judge, a state judge, a pregnant teenager, or a member of
Operation Rescue, and there is no reason to expect the same answer to
these different questions. Yet surely this dissolution of the very notion
of a common framework of law throughout society is unacceptable.
(6) Professor Alschuler, however, shows no sign of balking at the
idea that what counts as "law" varies from person to person within a
single society. Indeed, he at least appears to endorse an even more
bewildering and less coherent relativization when he asserts that "[l]awidentification" depends in part on "the form and extent of one's
noncompliance."84 If this means anything, it means that the manner in
which I violate a purported law-for example, whether I do so openly,
accepting punishment, or instead clandestinely-helps determine whether
what I violated is law in the first place! That seems grotesque. It
implies, for example, that whether a duly enacted statute is law is at
least to some extent for me to determine.
Professor Alschuler's apparent embrace of the puzzling relativism of
the last two paragraphs may help explain why he concludes that "no
definition of law can be any good" because "[1]aw is a matter of moreor-less rather than yes-or-no."85 That conclusion, however, is a non
sequitur. A "more-or-less" term does not thereby become immune from
definition: witness "bald," "obese," "witty," or "polite." Professor
Alschuler has argued that identifying what counts as law depends on an
indefinitely large host of factors. If he is correct, then certain kinds of
definition-in particular, a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for
being "law"--are impossible, but that does not preclude all definitions
whatsoever. Indeed, his own definition of law, as "those societal
settlements that a good person should regard as authoritative,"" is not
invalidated by the claim that law is a "more-or-less" rather than "yes-orno" matter (though I have tried to show that it faces many other serious
objections).
There is one further difficulty lurking in what Professor Alschuler
says about the nature of law. It is a difficulty that I note with considerable diffidence, because it concerns issues with a long history and an
extensive literature of which I am culpably ignorant. The difficulty lies
in Professor Alschuler's apparent endorsement of some form of "natural
law" position concerning the inseparability of law from moral norms.
The discussion in section IV of Professor Alschuler's paper moves from

83.
84.
85.
86.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See Alschuler, supra note 20, at 405.
See id.
See id. at 393.
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an explication of the views of Lon Fuller to what seems to be an
embrace of those views, though without any explicit declaration that
Fuller was correct. What is puzzling can be put in the form of two
claims. First, most of the norms that Professor Alschuler talks about are
not "moral" norms in any ordinary sense of "moral." Second, even if
they are, the most that has been established is a link between law and
the moral norms this society accepts, not a link between law and "true"
morality. Yet the latter sort of link is what classic "natural law"
positions depend upon. Let me defend these claims.
Professor Alschuler apparently accepts Fuller's view "that one often
cannot describe positive law-cannot make statements about what the
law is-without invoking moral norms."87 These norms are of two
kinds: some concern "the law's procedural prerequisites" and others "its
substantive content."8 " Procedurally, "a system of law requires rules
announced in advance, consistent with one another, understandable,
capable of being obeyed, and adhered to by the agencies charged with
administering them"89 -what Fuller called "the inner morality of
law."'9 Substantively, "normative-interpretive conventions"'" are
employed in determining the content of the law. As an example,
Professor Alschuler observes that the Constitution authorizes Congress
to establish an air force, even though it explicitly speaks only of
"Armies," "a Navy," and "the land and naval Forces."' What enables
lawyers to be confident that the law is that an air force is constitutional
is that they share, and apply, such norms as "like cases should be treated
alike" and "an authoritative text should be interpreted in light of the
evident objectives of its framers."93 Thus these moral norms (and
others like them) are indispensable in determining the content of
"positive law."
My first claim is that most of what Professor Alschuler calls "moral
norms" are not "moral" at all. This is strikingly true of the procedural
norms that he borrows from Fuller. Wholesale flouting of those norms
may well result, as Fuller claims, in failure to make "law" at all. If law
is "the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of
rules,"94 then laying down rules that humans simply cannot follow-because they are secret, or internally inconsistent, or incomprehen87. See id. at 382 (citing LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 97 (rev. ed. 1969)).
88. See id.
89. See id. at 383 (citing FULLER, supra note 87, at 33-94).
90. FULLER, supra note 87, at 42.
91. See Alschuler, supra note 20, at 384.
92. See id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 13, 14).
93. See id.
94. FULLER, supra note 87, at 96.
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sible, or the like-means bungling the law-making enterprise completely. But to say that Fuller's principles are implicit in the law-creating
enterprise in no way implies that these are moral principles:
[T]he crucial objection to the designation of these principles
of good legal craftsmanship as morality... is that it
perpetrates a confusion between two notions that it is vital
to hold apart: the notions of purposive activity and morality.
Poisoning is no doubt a purposive activity, and reflections
on its purpose may show that it has its internal principles.
("Avoid poisons however lethal if they cause the victim to
vomit," or "Avoid poisons however lethal if their shape,
color, or size is likely to attract notice.") But to call these
principles of the poisoner's art "the morality of poisoning"
would simply blur the distinction between the notion of
efficiency for a purpose and those final judgments about
activities and purposes with which morality in its various
forms is concerned.9"
One might object that a legal system that flouted Fuller's procedural
requirements in wholesale fashion-a system riddled with retroactive
laws, secret laws, inconsistent laws, and so forth-would not be
described simply as a "botched" or a "bungled" legal system but as an
unjust system. After all, this objection runs, an essential feature of a
legal system is that people are subject to sanctions for violating the
rules. If the rules are such as to make compliance impossible, it is
unjust to impose penalties or punishment for noncompliance.
I believe this objection fails. Although a legal system flouting
Fuller's principles is properly condemned as unjust, and thus immoral,
this does not imply that those principles themselves are moral in nature.
An auto mechanic who ignores the principles of good craftsmanship
appropriate to his occupation-principles like "Always tighten the lug
nuts fully after replacing the tires"-would also be open to moral
condemnation (when, for example, his customers die because their
wheels fall off while they are driving). But this does not make "Tighten
the lug nuts fully" into a moral principle.
Besides the procedural principles Professor Alschuler borrows from
Fuller, it is also doubtful whether most of the substantive, interpretive
norms at work in law-identification are genuinely moral. In Professor
Alschuler's air-force illustration, for example, two such norms are

95. H.L.A. Hart, Book Review, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1286 (1965) (reviewing LON L.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964)); accord MARTIN P. GOLDING, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
49 (1975); DAVID LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW 77 (1984).
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supposedly invoked: "like cases should be treated alike" and "an
authoritative text should be interpreted in light of the evident objectives
of its framers."96 Now, does the former of these norms actually do any
work here? If we fill in the details of just how the air-force example
would be handled, we might reason like this: The Constitution explicitly
authorizes Congress to establish land and naval forces. But these
provisions should be interpreted in light of the framers' evident
objective: permitting Congress to set up the military forces needed to
protect the nation against foreign powers. Once scientific advances allow
those powers (including potential aggressors) to create airborne military
forces, the framers' objective cannot be attained unless Congress is able
to establish an air force of its own. To avoid frustrating the framers'
objective, therefore, we should read the constitutional authorization of
"land and naval forces" and "armies" as extending to an air force.
Where, in this reasoning, has it been necessary to invoke the maxim that
like cases should be treated alike?
When the "like cases" principle is applied, it need not function as a
moral principle. One can view the principle as simply one of the "norms
of sound practical reasoning ' ' -a norm of rationality, not specifically
moral in nature. Moreover, which respects count as "relevant" will
depend on norms independent of the "like cases" principle. If in a given
application these supplementary norms are not themselves moral in
nature, neither is the "like cases" principle. In Professor Alschuler's
example, the second norm, requiring interpretation in light of the
framers' objectives, does all the work. And that norm is surely not
"moral" at all.9"
Let us concede, however, that at least some of the substantive norms
used in interpreting the law are properly called "moral" norms. Even
so-and this is my second claim-the use made of those norms in
identifying "the law" in no way depends on assuming that these norms
express genuinely valid moral insights. All that is presupposed is that
these are norms that are in fact accepted in our society. This means, first

96. See Alschuler, supra note 20, at 384.
97. Neil MacCormick, Natural Law and the Separationof Law and Morals, in NATURAL
LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 105, 121 (Robert P. George ed., 1992).
98. It is suggestive that in discussing the use of substantive norms in legal interpretation,
Alschuler cites Nelson Goodman's Fact, Fiction, and Forecast as showing that patterns of
decision, "common law rules and customs cannot be discovered empirically but must be
constructed normatively." Alschuler, supra note 20, at 386 & n.122. The "norms" Goodman
talks about are those needed to license ordinary inductive inferences about matters of fact-e.g.,
to infer that all emeralds are green on the basis of repeated, uniform past observations of green
emeralds. See NELSON GOODMAN, FACT, FICTION, AND FORECAST 72-83 (4th ed. 1983). Such
norms are in no way "moral."
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of all, that Professor Alschuler's position would hardly discomfort
Holmes, who was perfectly prepared to admit that principles and
judgments widely accepted in our society get used in interpreting law.
And secondly, it means that Professor Alschuler's position will not yield
the sort of strong, interesting connection between law and morality for
which the classical natural-law theorists contended. It will not, for
instance, allow us to conclude that a positive law that contravenes the
principles of true morality is no law at all (as Augustine," Aquinas,100 and Blackstone"0 all averred). Nor will it commit us to the
existence of "concepts of right and wrong that exist independently of
positive law and of the customs of particular communities," which
Professor Alschuler himself apparently believes to be a presupposition
of the concept of natural law.32
In discussing Holmes, I claimed that we can advance our understanding of a legal theorist's contentions by asking what view those
contentions aim at challenging or displacing. Professor Alschuler's
advocacy of "natural law" ideas seems designed to combat the defects
Alschuler finds both in Holmes and in his modem-day positivist
intellectual heirs. Thinkers in this camp, Professor Alschuler believes,
obscure or slight or completely ignore a number of significant ways in
which law and morals intertwine. They cannot explain why there is at
least a prima facie moral obligation to obey the law, nor why there are
difficult situations in which "the question of obligation is complex
and.., respect for law requires painful choices." They are blind to
the many instances in which legal rules impose genuine duties, not
merely the conditional requirement either to comply or to undergo
sanctions. They drastically distort the motives that induce compliance
with law, by focusing solely on the desire to avoid sanctions and
neglecting the belief that the law deserves respect and the "sense of
reciprocity or mutual obligation"" animating a great many citizens.
And they refuse to acknowledge that in the most extreme situations a
seriously unjust "law" may not really be "law" at all.

99. AUGUSTINE, ON FREE CHOICE OF THE WILL [DE LIBERO ARBITrO] 8 (Thomas
Williams trans., 1993) ("For it seems to me that an unjust law is no law at all.").
100. THoMAs AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, I-I, Q.95, A.2 ("[E]very law laid down by
men has the force of law in that it flows from natural law. If it is at variance with natural law,
it will not be law, but spoilt law [legis corruptio].").
101. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *41 (natural law is "superior in obligation
to any other," and "no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this").
102. Alschuler, supra note 20, at 398 n.145.
103. See id. at 399.
104. See id. at 356.
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There is much force, I believe, in Professor Alschuler's criticisms.
It is bizarre to neglect the difference between the state's eminent-domain
taking of a house and a tortfeasor's destroying it.105 It is baffling to
insist that the perspective of the "bad man" uniquely illuminates the
nature of law --especially when also insisting that the practice of
law "tends to make good citizens and good men."' "WIt is simplistic to
suppose that our values are simply "finalities," like a taste for chocolate
ice cream, immune from reasoning and deliberation." °' I hope that
calling attention to the difficulties with the position Professor Alschuler
has espoused may assist him in clarifying his views, deepening his
criticisms, and arriving at a more satisfactory overall picture of the
nature of law.

105.
106.
107.
108.

See id. at 411.
Holmes, supra note 32, at 459.
Id.
See Alschuler, supra note 20, at 407-08 n.188.
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